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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jim Howard was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence and proceeded 
to a bench trial on the State's allegation that his conviction should be enhanced to a 
felony because he had two prior DUI convictions within ten years. After ruling that the 
State's evidence regarding an alleged prior DUI out of California was inadmissible 
because it was not properly authenticated under I.C. 3 9-312, the district court acquitted 
Mr. Howard of the DUI felony sentencing enhancement. 
The State appealed from the district court's order acquitting Mr. Howard of the 
felony sentencing enhancement and the court's judgment of conviction. The State 
claims on appeal that the district court erred by relying on the authentication 
requirements contained in I.C. 5 9-312 for out-of-state judgments. Specifically, the 
State asserts that there is an unidentified conflict between this statute's provisions and 
the Idaho Rules of Evidence and that, therefore, this Court should render those portions 
of I.C. § 9-312 dealing with authentication of out-of-state judgments a nullity. 
However, the State's appeal is brought in violation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, there is no jurisdiction for the State's appeal 
in light of the constitutional prohibition against the State seeking a retrial through an 
appeal after an acquittal; under the provisions of I.A.R. ll(c)(4), which codifies the 
constitutional prohibition against the State seeking a new trial through the filing of an 
appeal once a defendant has been acquitted and; in addition this appeal is moot. 
Moreover, the State failed to raise any objection to the district court's application 
of I.C. § 9-312 at trial or to provide the district court with any argument as to why the 
State should be excused from complying with the provisions of this statute in order to 
demonstrate the admissibility of the State's evidence. Further, the State fails to provide 
argument or authority on appeal that would support its posture that the disputed 
provisions of I.C. § 9-312 should be rendered a nullity by this Court. 
A review of the pertinent portions of the Idaho Rules of Evidence - I.R.E. 901 
and I.R.E. 902 - further reveals no conflict between the provisions of these rules and 
those of I.C. 3 9-312. Because there is no conflict between the statute and the 
applicable rules of evidence, there is no basis upon which to invalidate the portions of 
I.C. § 9-312 that provide for the requirements to authenticate the judicial records of 
another state as a condition precedent to admissibility. As such, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion when it determined that the State's proffered evidence of the 
alleged prior conviction from California was inadmissible because it was not properly 
authenticated. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
Jim Howard was charged with driving under the influence and driving without 
privileges. (R., pp.41-42.) The State also sought two sentencing enhancements 
against Mr. Howard: first, the State alleged that his misdemeanor charge of driving 
under the influence should be enhanced to a felony based on the allegation that he had 
committed two prior DUI offenses within the previous ten years; and second, the State 
alleged that Mr. Howard had committed two prior felony offenses and was therefore 
subject to a sentencing enhancement for being a persistent violator. (R., pp.41-43.) 
Mr. Howard's first trial on the DUI charge ended in a mistrial as the jury was 
unable to reach a unanimous verdict. (R., pp.115-116.) Prior to his second trial, 
Mr. Howard entered a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor charge of driving without 
privileges. (R., p.152.) During the course of his second trial, Mr. Howard elected to 
have the second portion of his bifurcated trial - the portion dealing with the State's 
allegations regarding the sentencing enhancements - tried as a bench trial and waived 
his right to a jury. (Tr., p.179, L.20 - p.180, L.14, p.187, Ls.6-18.) In discussing this 
waiver with Mr. Howard, the district court also expressly informed him that, no matter 
whether the enhancements were tried before a jury or just before the court, that the 
State would still have to prove the facts alleged in support of the enhancement beyond 
a reasonable doubt. (Tr., p.187, Ls.6-18.) 
The jury found Mr. Howard guilty of driving under the influence, and he 
proceeded to a bench trial on the sentencing enhancements alleged by the State. 
(Tr., p.190, Ls.2-11; R., p.234.) The State attempted to introduce, a series of 
documents that the State asserted were proof that Mr. Howard had committed a prior 
DUI offense in Kern County, California. (Tr., p.204, L.24 - p.205, L.4; Exhibit 7.) These 
documents included a document listing the terms of probation, an acknowledgment and 
waiver of rights, the charging document, and court minutes for various proceedings in 
California. (Tr., p.206, L.2 - p.207, L.13.) There was no separate certification for these 
documents - all there was by way of authentication was a stamp at the bottom of the 
last page of documents that read the following: 
SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF KERN, METROPOLITAN DIVISION 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE IS A TRUE AND 
CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON 
FILE IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THIS COURT. 
DATED: 4-74-08 
BY: DawnKapp DEPUTY 
(Exhibit 7.) 
This stamp was only made on the last of the series of documents that the State 
attempted to admit into evidence against Mr. Howard and did not mention or incorporate 
by reference any of the other documents. (Exhibit 7.) 
Mr. Howard objected to the admission of these documents because they were 
not properly authenticated pursuant to I.R.E. 902.' (Tr., p.216, 1.24 - p.218, L.4, p.221, 
Ls.7-17.) When the State attempted to argue that the documents would come in 
pursuant to the hearsay exception contained in I.R.E. 803, the district court clarified for 
the State - twice - that the admissibility standards for purposes of hearsay were 
different and unrelated to the requirement of proper authentication of evidence as a 
condition precedent to its admissibility. (Tr., p.218, L.25 - p.219, L.17; p.226, Ls.9-18.) 
The district court then went through the admissibility standards contained in I.R.E. 902 
and determined that the evidence and "certification" proffered by the State failed to meet 
these requirements. (Tr., p.222, L.9 - p.223, L.?9.) 
In light of the district court's ruling, the State asked for, and was granted, a 
continuance so as to be able to meet the standards of authentication required in order 
to admit the evidence regarding Mr. Howard's alleged conviction from California. 
(Tr., p.227, Ls.7-8; p.228, Ls.15-16.) This continuance was granted over Mr. Howard's 
objection. (Tr., p.227, L . l l  - p.228, L.14.) 
' Mr. Howard also objected to the introduction of these documents as violative of his 
constitutional rights to confrontation. (Tr., p.211, L.9 - p.215, L.19.) The district court 
overruled this objection because the district court concluded that the judicial records 
from California were non-testimonial in nature." (Tr,. p.215, Ls.11-19.) 
At the continued trial to adjudicate the sentencing enhancements alleged by the 
State, the State attempted to renew its arguments that the single stamp originally 
presented as a "certification," met with the requisites of I.R.E. 902. (Tr., p.233, L.12 - 
p.234, L.25.) The district court again noted the deficiencies between the stamp on the 
document and the requirements for authentication under I.R.E. 902 and determined that 
the evidence was not admissible as it had not been properly authenticated. (Tr., p.236, 
Ls.1-22.) 
After the district court's ruling, the State then sought to admit Exhibit 76, which 
was the same series of documents from California that it had earlier tried to admit into 
evidence, this time accompanied by a letter certifying that the person signing the 
document, Dawn Kapp, was the custodian of records for Kern County Superior Court of 
the State of California and that all of the documents attached were true and correct 
copies of the official judicial records that were filed and recorded in her office. (Exhibit 
7B.) This document also contained a seal from Kern County Superior Court. (Exhibit 
7B.) However, there was no attestation provided by either the chief judge or a presiding 
magistrate from Kern County Superior Court attesting that the certification was in due 
form - that it met with the legal requirements for such an attestation - and that 
Ms. Kapp qualified under California law as the legal custodian or person otherwise 
authorized by law to attest to the authenticity of the documents. (Exhibit 76.) 
Mr. Howard then brought to the court's attention the ldaho State case of State v. 
prince2 and the federal standards contained in 28 U.S.C.A. $ 1738 regarding the 
standards of authentication that must be met in order for the State to introduce a foreign 
State v. Prince, 64 ldaho 343,132 P.2d 146 (1942). 
5 
judgment - a judgment from another state - and for that judgment to be accorded full 
faith and credit in the Idaho courts. (Tr., p.238, Ls.5-18.) Among these standards was 
the requirement that the certification provided by the custodian of the documents be 
accompanied by an attestation from the judge of that court that the certification is in 
proper form. (Tr., p.238, Ls.5-18.) Mr. Howard noted that the State failed to provide the 
proper attestation to authenticate the California documents it was seeking to admit. 
(Tr., p.238, L.18.) 
The State again moved for a continuance so as to address the argument raised 
regarding the failure to meet the standards as articulated in 28 U.S.C.A. 3 1738 and the 
Prince case. (Tr., p.263, Ls.14-19.) As before, Mr. Howard again objected to this 
motion, noting that it would be the State's third opportunity to try to correct its failure to 
provide proper authentication for the documents it was seeking to admit into evidence 
against Mr. Howard. (Tr., p.263, L.22 - p.264, L.19.) A second continuance was 
granted so that the parties could provide briefing to the district court regarding the 
authentication issue. (Tr., p.290, L.15 - p.291, L.7.) 
After the second proceeings regarding the sentencing enhancements, 
Mr. Howard submitted a memorandum to the district court regarding the full faith and 
credit clause of the federal constitution and the applicability of the authentication 
requirements of I.C. § 9-312 to the California documentation the State was seeking to 
admit. (R., pp.258-261.) He asserted that, because the State failed to comply with the 
authentication requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C.A. 3 1738, and those contained in 
I.C. 3 9-312, the State's evidence was not admissible. (R., pp.258-261.) In light of this, 
there was insufficient evidence to establish either the felony enhancement on the DUI 
conviction alleged by the State or to establish the prior felonies alleged by the State in 
support of the persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.258-261.) 
The State filed a Memorandum in Support of Admissibility of California 
Documentation and Motion to Reconsider. (R., pp.253-257.) In its memorandum, the 
State asserted that the documentation from California complied with the authentication 
requirements of I.R.E. 902(4) because the stamp itself should be considered a "seal" 
and the stamp purported to contain a certification. (R., pp.253-257.) The State further 
conceded that the most applicable source for what constitutes a proper seal is statutory 
law. (R., p.255.) 
With regard to Mr. Howard's arguments concerning full faith and credit and the 
authentication requirement contained in I.C. § 9-312, the State asserted that states may 
enact statutes or rules that impose a lesser burden of authentication than that required 
in 28 U.S.C.A. 3 1738, although the states may not impose a greater burden before 
giving a judicial record of another state full faith and credit. (R., pp.263-265.) The 
State's argument omitted in its entirety any mention of the authentication requirements 
of I.C. § 9-312, and further failed to provide any argument or analysis as to why this 
statute was not binding on the State for purposes of admitting out-of-state judicial 
records into evidence. (R., pp.263-265.) Although the State noted in its memorandum 
that the states were free to adopt a lesser standard for authentication than that 
contained in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738, the State made no argument that the standard 
adopted by the State of Idaho was different and lesser than the federal standard. 
(R., pp.263-265.) 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Part II and Part Ill, the district 
court acquitted Mr. Howard of both of the sentencing enhancements alleged by the 
~ t a t e . ~  (R., pp.273-283.) In so doing, the district court noted the provisions regarding 
authentication of foreign judgments in I.C. § 9-312 and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 were nearly 
identicaL4 (R., p.278.) In light of this, the district court held that all of the State's 
arguments regarding the ability of the states to impose a lesser requirement for 
authentication of foreign judgments were irrelevant, given that ldaho had expressly 
adopted the same standard as that found in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738. (R., p.279.) 
Further, while acknowledging the State's blanket assertion that a certificate from 
a chief judge or presiding magistrate of the other state was not required, the district 
court also made clear that there was no reasoned analysis to support this claim. 
(R., pp.279-280.) Specifically, the district court noted, "The State doesn't tell this Court 
Because the State has conceded that the district court was correct in excluding the 
State's evidence regarding the persistent violator allegation, and therefore raises no 
issue on appeal regarding the district court's ruling on the evidence and Mr. Howard's 
acquittal of this enhancement, those aspects of the district court's order specific only to 
the persistent violator enhancement are not discussed herein. (Appellant's Brief, p.1 
n.1.) 
The language of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 provides, in pertinent part, that: 
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, 
Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in 
other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions 
by the attestation of fhe clerk and seal of the court annexed, if such seal 
exists, together with a certificate of fhe judge of the court that the said 
aftestation is in proper form. 
The ldaho Legislature adopted a nearly identical provision for authentication of out-of- 
state judgments for purposes of admissibility into evidence in I.C. C) 9-312, which 
provides in pertinent part that judgments or other judicial records from another state 
"may be proved by the attestation of the clerk and the seal of the court annexed, if there 
be a clerk and a seal, together with a certificate of the chief judge or presiding 
magistrate, that the attestation is in true form. See I.C. 9 9-312. 
'why' it has that interpretation," and further concluded in light of the statute and case law 
interpreting I.C. 5 9-312 that the State's assertion was "baseless." (R., pp.279-280.) 
The court then found that compliance with I.C. 3 9-312 was mandatory in order for a 
purported judicial record of another state to be admissible into evidence. (R., pp.279- 
282.) In light of the lack of sufficient evidence to support the State's alleged sentencing 
enhancements in absence of the excluded evidence, the district court then acquitted Mr. 
Howard of both the alleged felony enhancement on his DUI charge and of the State's 
persistent violator allegation. (R., pp.282-283.) 
The State timely appealed from the district court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order Regarding Part I1 and Part Ill, which acquitted Mr. Howard of both sentencing 
enhancements alleged by the State, and from the judgment entered by the district court. 
(R., pp.289-290.) 
ISSUES 
1. Should this Court dismiss the State's appeal because it is brought in violation of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment; is specifically prohibited by 
the terms of I.A.R. ll(c)(4); and because this appeal is not justiciable because 
the State would not be entitled to the relief requested, rendering this appeal 
moot? 
2. Has the State failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in 
deeming the California documentation regarding Mr. Howard's alleged prior DUI 
conviction inadmissible due to the failure of the State to properly authenticate 
these documents? 
ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Dismiss The State's Appeal Because It Is Brought In Violation Of The 
Double Jeoaardy Clause Of The Fifth Amendment: Is Saecifically Prohibited Bv The 
Terms Of I.A.R. I I (c)(4); And Because This Appeal Is Not Justiciable Because The 
State Would Not Be Entitled To The Relief Requested, Rendering This Ap~ea l  Moot 
A. Introduction 
After the district court's ruling excluding portions of the State's evidence as not 
properly authenticated and therefore inadmissible, the district court acquitted 
Mr. Howard based upon the insufficiency of the remaining evidence to demonstrate his 
guilt of the felony enhancement. Upon this acquittal, double jeopardy prohibitions 
attached and the State cannot constitutionally seek to revive its case on the felony 
enhancement through pursuing this appeal. Additionally, under the terms of I.A.R. 
11(c)(4), the State's appeal is barred because it is attempting to obtain appellate review 
of an order "where the constitutionai guarantee against double jeopardy would 
otherwise prevent a second trial." Finally, this same double jeopardy prohibition against 
retrial on the felony enhancement alleged by the State renders this case moot, as the 
State would not be entitled to the relief requested in this appeal even if they prevailed 
on the merits of their argument. 
5. Standard Of Review 
Constitutional issues are issues of pure law that this Court reviews de novo. 
See, e.g., State v. Grazian, 144 ldaho 510, 513, 164 P.3d 790, 793 (2007). This Court 
also exercises de novo review over questions of jurisdiction. See Taylor v. Maile, 146 
ldaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 3282, 1286 (2009); Weller v. State, 146 ldaho 652, 653, 200 
P.3d 1201, 1202 (Ct. App. 2008). The question of the on-going justiciability of a case is 
likewise an issue of law that is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. 
Tager, 952 A.2d I ,  15 (Conn. 2008). That is because, "justiciability is a question of the 
jurisdiction of the court over the matter at issue." State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 
C. This Court Should Dismiss The State's Appeal Because It Is Brouaht In Violation 
Of The Double Jeopardy Clause Of The Fifth Amendment: Is Specifically 
Prohibited Bv The Terms Of I.A.R. 11(c)(4): And Because This Appeal Is Not 
Justiciable Because The State Would Not Be Entitled To The Relief Reauested, 
Renderina This Appeal Moot 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
prevents the State from seeking a second prosecution for the same offense after an 
acquittal. See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 497-498 (1984); see also Ball v. 
U.S., 163 U.S. 662 (1896). It is this prohibition that generally precludes the State from 
seeking a new trial through the pursuit of an appeal after the defendant has been 
acquitted of the charged offense. As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court, "it is one of the 
elemental principles of our criminal law that the Government cannot secure a new trial 
by means of an appeal even though an acquittal may appear erroneous." Green v. 
U.S., 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957). This is because, "the State with all its resources and 
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an 
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and 
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as 
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." Id. at 187- 
It is clear that the facts underpinning sentencing enhancements must be proved 
by the State beyond a reasonable doubt if they increase the statutory maximum 
punishment that may be visited upon the defendant. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466,476 (2000). As noted by the Apprendi Court: 
when the term "sentence enhancement is used to describe an increase 
beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional 
equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the 
jury's guilty verdict. Indeed, it fits squarely within the usual definition of an 
"element" of the offense. 
Id. at 494 n.19. 
Thus, sentencing enhancements are treated as elements of the offense itself for 
purposes of proof. State v. Gerardo, 147 ldaho 22, 30, 205 P.3d 671, 679 (Ct. App. 
2009) (facts justifying a sentencing enhancement are treated as elements of the offense 
for purposes of pleading and proof). Because any distinction between the underlying 
offense and a sentencing enhancement has been eliminated with regard to treatment 
for purposes of proof at trial, there is no principled reason to make any distinction 
between the underlying offense and a sentencing enhancement with regard to the 
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Satfazahn v. 
Pennsylvania, 527 U.S. 101, I 1  1-1 12 (2003) (noting that there is no principled reason to 
distinguish between the standards articulated in Apprendi as to what constitutes an 
"offense" and what constitutes an offense for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Double 
Jeopardy Clause); State v. Sawatzky, 125 P.3d 722,726 (Or. 2005). 
Although it appears that no court in ldaho has yet to speak on the issue of 
whether double jeopardy prevents the retrial of a sentencing enhancement once the 
defendant has been acquitted, those jurisdictions considering the issue in the aftermath 
of Apprendi appear to be uniform in holding that double jeopardy bars both an appeal 
and a retrial of such acquittal. See U.S. v. Blanton, 476 F.3d 767, 770-771 (gth Cir. 
2007); U.S. v. Valasco-Heredia, 319 F.3d 1080, 1086-1087 (gth Cir. 2003) (Double 
Jeopardy Clause bars government from proving facts on remand which increase a 
sentence beyond the statutory maximum not proven in the original prosecution); 
Sawafzky, 125 P.3d at 726; see also Hankerson v. State, 723 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Minn. 
2006) (recognizing that, had the district court acquitted the defendant of the sentencing 
enhancement, double jeopardy might prevent retrial of those factors on resentencing). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' Opinion in Blanton is on all fours with the 
facts of this case. The defendant in Blanfon was charged with a sentencing 
enhancement based upon the State's allegation that he had three prior violent felony 
convictions. Blanton, 476 F.3d at 768. He faced a bifurcated trial in which his 
underlying criminal charge was tried to a jury, but the sentencing enhancement was 
tried before the district court. Id. at 769. The defendant challenged the State's use of 
two of the three convictions alleged on the basis that the prior offenses were non-jury 
juvenile adjudications that could not stand as predicate offenses for the enhancement. 
Id. The district court agreed with the defendant's assertion, excluded the evidence of 
the prior juvenile convictions, and thereafter entered a judgment of acquittal based upon 
the legal insufficiency of the remaining State's evidence. Id. The State in Blanton filed 
a notice of appeal from the acquittal. Id. The defendant asserted that the State's 
appeal was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and 
argued, in the alternative, that the district court's exclusion of the evidence was proper. 
Id. 
The Blanfon Court determined that, regardless of the legal soundness of the 
district court's exclusion of the state's evidence, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the 
State's appeal because the district court rendered an acquittal of the sentencing 
enhancement by finding that the remaining evidence presented by the State was legally 
insufficient to sustain a conviction. Id. at 770. The court then noted that it was 
irrelevant for double jeopardy purposes whether the acquittal was based on legal error; 
and therefore jeopardy attached to the trial court's judgment of acquittal, "whether it was 
made in error or not." Id. at 771. Because double jeopardy barred the State's appeal, 
the court in Blanfon dismissed the State's appeal. This Court should do the same. 
Moreover, this view is consistent with what the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
recognized, in dicta, in State v. Nichols, 124 ldaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 
(Ct. App. 1993). There, the court recognized that if the district court excludes evidence 
in support of an element of a criminal offense and an acquittal ensues, "the state is 
given no second chance through a retrial nor an opportunity to reverse the acquittal by 
challenging the trial court's evidentiary ruling on appeal." Id. (emphasis added). 
The district court entered a judgment of acquittal based upon its determination 
that, in absence of the excluded evidence, there was legally insufficient evidence to 
support the State's felony enhancement allegation. (R., pp.282-283.) After this 
acquittal, double jeopardy prohibitions attached to this allegation and the Double 
Jeopardy Clause precludes the State from seeking a second trial on the felony 
allegation through this appeal. As such, this Court should dismiss this appeal for want 
of jurisdiction. 
In addition, this appeal is also barred by the operation of I.A.R. ll(c)(4), which 
codifies the constitutional prohibition against the State seeking a new trial through the 
filing of an appeal once a defendant has been acquitted, ldaho Appellate Rule 11 
governs appealable judgments and orders, and provides in pertinent part that, "this 
provision shall not authorize a new trial in any case where the constitutional guarantee 
against double jeopardy would otherwise prevent a new trial." I.A.R. I l(c)(4). 
As previously noted, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a retrial by the State 
on the felony enhancement of which Mr. Howard was acquitted by the district court. 
Therefore, by the terms of I.A.R. ll(c)(4), there is no appealable order on the State's 
appeal in this case. 
Finally, appellate review of an issue is generally precluded where the issue on 
appeal is moot. Sfate v. Manley, 142 ldaho 338, 343, 127 P.3d 954, 960 (2005). An 
issue is moot if a favorable decision would not result in any relief for the appealing party. 
Id. The State in this case is seeking a remand for resentencing. (Appellant's Brief, 
p l . )  However, because there has been no finding, based upon admissible evidence, 
that Mr. Howard had committed two prior misdemeanor offenses within ten years as 
alleged by the State in support of its felony enhancement charge, this case would have 
to be remanded for retrial on the enhancement allegation. Because the Double 
Jeopardy Clause would bar such retrial, even a favorable decision on the district court's 
evidentiary ruling in this case would not result in any relief for the State. This appeal is 
therefore moot. 
The State Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Deemina The California Documentation Regardina Mr. Howard's Alleaed Prior DUI 
Conviction Inadmissible Due To The Failure Of The State To Properlv Authenticate 
These Documents 
A. Introduction 
The State's challenge to the district court's application of the authentication 
requirements of I.C. 3 9-312 to the evidence that the State sought to admit at trial was 
not raised before the district court and therefore cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. Even if this issue were preserved for appeal, the State fails to provide this 
Court with argument and authority that would sustain the State's contention that this 
Court should deem portions of I.C. § 9-312 a nullity. 
While it is unclear whether the State is asserting a conflict between I.C. 3 9-312 
and I.R.E. 803, or between this statute and I.R.E. 902, either claim fails. ldaho Rule of 
Evidence 803 deals with admissibility for hearsay purposes - when evidence is 
admissible for the specific purpose of showing proof of the matter asserted. ldaho Code 
§ 9-312 deals with a separate question for purposes of admissibility, authentication, 
which is an question of whether there has been a sufficient showing that the evidence is 
what it is purported to be. Finally, a review of the pertinent portions of the ldaho Rules 
of Evidence dealing with authentication issues - I.R.E. 901 and I.R.E. 902 - reveals that 
there is, in fact, no conflict between these rules and the provisions of I.C. 5 9-312. In 
absence of such a conflict, there is simply no basis for this Court to treat as surplusage 
or a legal nullity those portions of I.C. 3 9-312 that provide for the authentication of 
foreign judgments. 
6. Standard Of Review 
This Court reviews the district court's determinations regarding the admission or 
exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Grazian, 144 ldaho at 513, 
164 P.3d at 793; U.S. v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1072 n.6 (gth Cir. 2005). Additionally, 
if the district court reaches the correct result, even under erroneous reasoning, this 
Court will affirm the district court's order under the correct theory. State v. Fisher, 140 
ldaho 365, 373, 93 P.3d 696, 704 (2004). 
It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that this Court will not 
interpret a statute in such a manner as to nullify it and will not construe the meaning of a 
statute in such a way which creates mere surplusage of the provisions contained 
therein. Sweifzer v. Dean, 118 ldaho 568, 572, 798 P.2d 27, 31 (1990). "It is the duty 
of the courts in construing statutes to harmonize and reconcile laws whenever possible 
and to adopt that construction of statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it 
with other statutory provisions." Id. (quoting Sampson v. Layton, 86 ldaho 453, 387 
P.2d 883 (1963)). Similarly, the ldaho Supreme Court has recently held that, "when a 
statute and rule 'can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict between 
them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way that results in a 
conflict."' State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974, 188 P.3d 912, 916 (2008) (quoting 
Stafe V. Currington, 108 ldaho 539, 543, 700 P.2d 942, 946 (1985) (Bakes, J., 
dissenting)). 
Statutes that are in pari materia - that relate to the same subject matter - are 
read together and taken as a unified system in order to further the intent of the 
legislature. State v. Jeppesen, 138 ldaho 71, 75, 57 P.3d 782, 786 (2002). This Court 
similarly reads statutes and ldaho court rules in conjunction with one another in other 
contexts involving criminal trials or sentencing where the statute and the court rule deal 
with the same subject matter. See, e.g., Murillo v. State, 144 ldaho 449, 452, n.1, 163 
P.3d 238, 241 (Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing co-extensive right to an interpreter in both 
statute and court rule); State v. Dorsey, 139 ldaho 149, 150-51, 75 P.3d 203, 204-205 
(Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing legal sufficiency of an information as being governed by 
both statute and court rule); State v. Pole, 139 ldaho 370, 372, 79 P.3d 729, 731 
(Ct. App. 2003) (citing to both statute and court rule for standards of probable cause 
hearing) 
C. The State Has Waived Anv Allegation Of Error With Reaard To The District 
Court's Application Of The Authentication Requirements Contained In I.C. 6 9- 
312 -
In this case, the State is challenging, for the first time on appeal, the district 
court's application of I.C. § 9-312 to the State's proffered evidence in determining that 
this evidence did not meet the authentication requirements that are a pre-condition to 
the admissibility of evidence. Because the State never raised any argument regarding 
the applicability of this statute before the district court, despite numerous opportunities 
to do so, the State has waived this issue on appeal. 
It is well established that an issue not raised before the district court will not be 
considered for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Alexander, 138 ldaho 18, 25, 
56 P.3d 780, 787 (Ct. App. 2002). This rule applies where the ruling in question is the 
district court's discretionary determination of whether to admit or exclude evidence. 
See, e.g., Stafe V. Segovia, 93 ldaho 594, 597, 468 P.2d 660, 663 (1970); Gemkist 
Farms, lnc. v. Bolen, 102 Idaho 906, 908, 643 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The prosecutor in this case had two separate chances to provide sufficient 
authentication as required by I.R.E. 902(4) and I.C. § 9-312, and three opportunities to 
make any argument as to why the requirements of I.C. § 9-312 should not apply - 
including both hearings on Parts II and Ill of the Information and the further opportunity 
provided by the district court to present additional briefing on the issue of authentication. 
The State failed to do so on every occasion. As noted in the district court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Part I1 and Part Ill, the State failed to 
comply with the requirement of an attestation from the chief judge or presiding 
magistrate of the California court attesting that the certification provided was in due 
form. (R., p.279.) In addition, the district court also noted specifically that, while the 
State argued it did not have to comply with this requirement, "The State does not tell 
this Court 'why' it has that interpretation." (R., pp.279-280.) 
The State neglected to raise at trial, and therefore to preserve, any issue 
regarding the applicability of the authentication requirements of I.C. 3 9-312. 
Accordingly, this issue has been waived on appeal. 
D. The District Court Acted Properly And In Accordance With Applicable Legal 
Standards When It Deemed The California Documentation Regarding 
Mr. Howard's Alleaed Prior DUI Conviction From That State Inadmissible Due To 
The State's Failure To Properly Authenticate Those Documents As A Condition 
Precedent To Their Admissibility 
The State's central assertion on appeal is that the district court erred when it 
applied the authentication requirements for foreign judgments as articulated in I.C. § 9- 
312 to the evidence that the State sought to admit in support of its allegation that 
Mr. Howard had been found guilty of a prior DUI in the State of California within the 
relevant ten year period. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-10.) ldaho Code 9-312 provides as 
follows: 
A judicial record of this state, or of the United States, may be proved by 
the production of the original, or by a copy thereof, certified by the clerk or 
other person having the legal custody thereof. That of another state or 
territory may be proved by the attestation of the clerk and the seal of the 
court annexed, if there be a clerk and seal, together with a certificate of 
the chief judge or presiding magistrate, that the attestation is in due form. 
I.C. § 9-312 (emphasis added), 
It is the italicized portion of this statute that is central to the State's allegation. 
Specifically, the State is asking this Court to nullify this provision of I.C. $j 9-312 based 
upon a blanket assertion that the State was not obligated to comply with statute, 
"because a statutory provision that purports to govern the admissibility of evidence that 
is in conflict with the rules of evidence is of no force or effect." (Appellant's Brief, pp.5- 
6) (emphasis added.) The State's assertion that it had no obligation to comply with this 
statute is without merit for two reasons - first, the State has failed entirely to identify 
what provision of the ldaho Rules of Evidence it is relying upon or how this rule conflicts 
with I.C. § 9-312; and second, because the rule of evidence dealing with the 
authentication of certified copies of public records - I.R.E. 902(4) - is fully consistent, 
and therefore not in conflict, with I.C. 3 9-312. Because there is no conflict between the 
rule and the statute, there is no basis for this Court to render an entire provision of 
I.C. § 9-312 a nullity. 
A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. 
State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). In this case, the State's 
argument is lacking on both grounds. The State has failed to identify: (1) which of the 
rules of evidence that the State is relying upon in its assertion of a conflict between the 
ldaho Rules of Evidence and I.C. § 9-312; and (2) how it is that a conflict exists between 
I.C. fj 9-312 and the unidentified rule of evidence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-10.) This 
omission not only waives this issue on appeal, but is also of particular significance given 
that this Court applies a strong policy in favor of reasonably interpreting rules and 
statutes so that there is no conflict between them. 
While there is no express argument made as to which of the rules of evidence 
the State believes conflicts with I.C. § 9-3?2, there are two provisions from the ldaho 
Rules of Evidence that the State makes a passing reference to: I.R.E. 803, dealing with 
hearsay exceptions, and I.R.E. 902(4), dealing with authentication requirements for 
certified copies of public records. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5, 7.) However, a review of 
both of these rules reveals no conflict between them and the authentication 
requirements for judgments issued from another state contained within I.C. $3 9-312. 
With regard to I.R.E. 803, the State fails to recognize that this provision of the 
ldaho Rules of Evidence addresses an entirely separate and unrelated consideration 
than I.C. § 9-312 regarding the admissibility of evidence. An objection as to 
admissibility on the basis of hearsay is a fundamentally different issue than an objection 
to admissibility on the basis of the failure to properly authenticate evidence. See, e.g., 
Cify of Idaho Falls v. Beco Consfruction Co., lnc., 123 ldaho 516, 526, 850 P.2d 165, 
175 (1993). This distinction was specifically noted by the district court on two separate 
occasions. (Tr., p.218, L.25 - p.219, L.17; p.226, Ls.9-18.) The provisions of I.R.E. 803 
outline when evidence is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness. I.R.E. 803 (emphasis added). Therefore, this rule governs 
when evidence is admissible for a particular purpose - as proof of the matters asserted 
therein. See I.R.E. 801(c). On the other hand, I.C. § 9-312 deals with authentication of 
judicial records, which deals with the condition precedent to admissibility that the 
proponent demonstrate that the evidence is what its proponent claims. See I.C. 9- 
312, I.R.E. 901. 
This interpretation is consistent with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in 
Weiland, relied on as authority by the State, in which the court analyzed separately the 
potential admissibility of evidence of the defendant's alleged out-of-state conviction on 
the basis of hearsay and the basis of authentication. Weiland, 420 F.3d at 1071-1075. 
Because I.R.E. 803 and I.C. fj 9-312 deal with unrelated issues regarding the 
admissibility of evidence, they do not conflict with one another by their terms. 
The second rule of evidence mentioned briefly by the State, I.R.E. 902(4), is a 
more likely source of potential conflict, as it deals with the same subject matter as 
I.C. 9-312 - authentication of judicial records5 However, reading together the 
provisions of this rule and statute, they are not in conflict. 
Authentication of evidence is a condition precedent to its admissibility, and such 
authentication may be made by "[alny method of authentication or identification 
provided by the Supreme Court rule or by a statufe or as provided in the Constitution of 
this State." I.R.E. 901(a), (b)(?O). By its terms, the rules of evidence regarding 
authentication embrace the notion that ldaho statutes are an appropriate source of 
guidelines as to the admissibility of evidence. ldaho Rule of Evidence 902(4) deals with 
authentication of certified records of public documents, and provides that a certified 
public document will be deemed self-authenticating if it is: 
Judicial records fall within the scope of "public records" for purposes of the rules of 
evidence. See Weiland, 420 F.3d at 1072. 
A copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a document 
authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a 
public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as correct 
by fhe custodian or other person authorized to make fhe certification, by 
certificate complying with paragraph (I), (2), or (3) of this rule or 
complying with any law of the United States or this State, or rule 
prescribed by the ldaho Supreme Court. 
I.R.E. 902(4) (emphasis added). 
There is nothing in the ldaho Rules of Evidence that delineates who qualifies as 
a custodian of public records, or would otherwise be legally authorized to make the 
certification of those records. This is a matter resolved internally by the operations of 
the courts themselves. And this is precisely why the requirement of an attestation by 
the chief judge or presiding magistrate of another state is required under I.C. 3 9-312: 
because the courts of ldaho are not in a position to easily determine whether the 
certification provided by another jurisdiction is in due form - i.e. that it meets with that 
State's laws regarding proper certification of evidence and that the person certifying the 
documents is legally competent to do so. 
The Missouri Court of Appeals provides a helpful analysis in clarifying this point. 
See Stafe v. Monroe, 18 S.W.3d 455, 458-459 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). In Monroe, the 
court ruled that portions of the State's evidence of court records from another state were 
inadmissible because they were not properly authenticated. Id. As does ldaho, 
Missouri has an authentication statute that requires that judicial records from other 
states be attested by the judge to be certified in due form. Id. at 458, I.C. § 9-312. 
However, of the three exhibits the State was seeking to admit as evidence of judicial 
records from another state, the judicial attestation only applied to one. Id. at 459. 
Because of this, the court ruled that the other two exhibits were not admissible because 
they were not properly authenticated. Id. 
The Monroe Court clarified the rationale behind the requirement of a judicial 
attestation for the clerk's certification of foreign judgments. The purpose of this 
certification is to assure the court that the clerk's attestation was proper under the laws 
of the sending state. Id. Because it is the clerk of the court who is the legal custodian 
of records and has the ability and power to certify the correctness, the requirement of 
judicial attestation subsumes an attestation that the certification is in due form because 
the person making it qualifies under the rules of evidence as a person legally entitled to 
make the certification as to the correctness of the judicial records. Id. 
Given that the provisions of I.C. § 9-312 provide the district courts with a means 
of assuring that the certification of judgments of another state meet with the legal 
standards of that state and are certified by one having proper legal authority, as 
required by I.R.E. 902(4), this statute complements and completes the dictates of the 
rule's authentication requirements. It does not conflict with them. And, in absence of a 
conflict, this Court should give effect to the provisions of I.C. 3 9-312 rather than 
arbitrarily rendering it a nullity. 
Given that there is no conflict between the rules of evidence and I.C. § 9-312, the 
district court did not err when it found the State's evidence in this case inadmissible for 
the failure to comply with the judicial attestation requirement in LC. § 9-312. While there 
are not many ldaho cases addressing the provisions of I.C. 3 9-312, the ldaho Supreme 
Court decision in State v. Prince, 64 ldaho 343, 132 P.2d 146 (1942)~ is instructive. In 
Prfnce, the Court concluded that compliance with the predecessor statute to I.C. 3 9- 
312 rendered the defendant's out-of-state judgments admissible to show that the 
defendant was a persistent violator. Prince, 132 P.2d at 148. This authentication was 
proper because it complied with all of the requirements of I.C. 3 9-312, including the 
requirement of an attestation by the presiding judge of the Oregon court from which the 
judicial records were issued. Id. Also notable is the fact that the Prince Court 
acknowledged that part of the purpose of compliance with I.C. § 9-312 was to show that 
the judgments were what they purported to be, which is also a pre-condition of 
admissibility under I.R.E. 901. Id.; see also Smifh v. Smifh, 95 ldaho 477, 483, 511 
P.2d 294, 300 (1973) (to be admissible into evidence, excerpts from an out-of-state 
court proceeding must be first authenticated pursuant to the provisions of I.C. § 9-312). 
This is also consistent with the portion of the holding in Weiland that deals 
directly with the authentication requirements of Rule 902(4). In Weiland, the 
authentication materials submitted by the State for the out-of-state judicial records 
included a certification from the manager of the prison records where the judicial 
records were stored that the documents were true and accurate copies of the official 
records and that the manager of these records held them in his legal custody. Weiland, 
420 F.3d at 1068. In addition, the State also presented an attestation from the 
Secretary of State for the State of Oklahoma, accompanied by a seal, that the manager 
The Prince decision references the statute at issue as I.C.A. 3 16-310. However, this 
statute was subsequently renumbered as I.C. !j 9-312 without any substantive change 
to the provisions of this statute. 
of prison records "was authorized to sign the attached certification, and that Greene's 
signature on the certification was genuine." Id. 
The court in Weiland noted that the certification met both with the requirements 
of Rule 902(4), and further met with the means of proving a domestic record under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44(a)(l). Id. at 1073. While ldaho has no equivalent to 
F.R.C.P. 44, the text of this rule imposes requirements that are nearly identical to the 
judicial certification requirement of I.C. § 9-312 -that the certification by the officer with 
legal custody of the record be made under seal "by a judge of a court of record in the 
district court political subdivision where the record is kept." F.R.C.P. 44(a)(l)(B)(i). This 
rule also makes a provision that the attestation could be provided by another public 
officer with a seal of office in those cases where the domestic record is kept by an entity 
other than a court. F.R.C.P. 44(a)(l)(B)(ii). The Court in Weiland relied specifically on 
the attestation by the Secretary of State of the State of Oklahoma that the person 
certifying the records was authorized to do so in finding that the judicial records had 
been properly authenticated pursuant to Rule 902(4). Weiland, 420 F.3d at 1068, 1073- 
1074. 
Finally, the State has asserted that, "In order to prove the DUI enhancement, the 
State was only required to produce certified copies of judgments indicating Howard had 
previously been convicted of two DUls within ten years." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
However, a review of the cases cited by the State reveals that neither of these cases 
support the State's argument that compliance with the authentication requirements for 
out-of-state judgments contained within I.C. § 9-312 is not required. The State cites two 
cases in support of its contention: Stafe v. Medrain, 143 ldaho 329, 144 P.3d 34 
(Ct. App. 2006), and State v. Smifh, 116 ldaho 553, 777 P.2d 1226 (1989). Neither of 
these cases address any issue regarding the admissibility of the State's evidence, nor 
do they address the more specific question of whether the authentication requirements 
for out-of-state judgments contained in I.C. § 9-312 should be read in conjunction with 
I.R.E. 902(4) for purposes of admissibility of those records. 
The issue in Medrain was whether the State had presented sufficient evidence of 
the defendant's identity in order to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was a persistent violator. Medrain, 143 ldaho at 331-333, 144 P.3d at 36-38. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals determined that there was not sufficient evidence of 
identity, but not on any grounds regarding the authentication or other issue as to the 
admissibility of the evidence. Id. Similarly, the issue presented in Smifh was not related 
to authentication or admissibility of evidence to prove the persistent violator sentencing 
enhancement imposed on the defendant. Rather, the issue was whether the State was 
required to "wholly eliminate a possibility that the prior crimes were misdemeanors, 
rather than felonies, when [the defendant] committed them." Smith, 116 ldaho at 560, 
777 P.2d at 1233. Because neither of these cases addressed any issue regarding the 
admissibility of the State's evidence, much less the discrete question of whether the 
authentication requirements of I.C. § 9-312 for out-of-state judgments must be met as a 
condition precedent to admissibility, the holdings of the cases relied on by the State do 
not even constitute dicta on the questions presented in this appeal. 
The State in this case was given two separate opportunities to provide proper 
authentication of the judicial records from California that it was seeking to introduce. 
The State declined to do so both times. As noted by the district court in its 
Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Part I1 and Part Ill, the burden on the 
State of establishing proper authentication is not an unusual or onerous one. 
(R., p.282.) The court further noted that, "This Court provides certificates and 
attestations of convictions from this Court to other State and federal courts frequently. It 
involves only a slight amount of effort." (R., p.282.) The proper remedy for the State's 
failure to abide by the standards of authentication of evidence is not to simply nullify 
those standards. The proper remedy is the one imposed by the district court in this 
case - exclusion of the evidence not properly authenticated and consideration of the 
remaining evidence. And the remaining evidence in this case was legally insufficient to 
support the State's allegation that Mr. Howard's DUI conviction should be enhanced to a 
felony. As such, this Court should affirm the district court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order Regarding Part II and Part Ill, and judgment entered by the district court. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Howard respectfully requests that this Court dismiss the State's appeal. In 
the alternative, he respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Part II and Part Ill, and judgment entered 
by the district court. 
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